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Abstract  
Although the debate on the basic norms of punishment is well established, the 
basic norms of policing have received relatively little attention. This paper 
connects the two subjects, defending two claims. First, it argues that some police 
action that is not obviously illegitimate falls under the moral standards 
applicable to punishment. This may strike some as surprising. The explicit job of 
the police does not include punishment. Such a position is customarily defended 
by appeal to intention, form of treatment, or expression of censure. Such appeals 
prove ineffective against cases that involve a discretionary decision not to 
prosecute, such as in the recruitment of informants or in standard public order 
management tactics. Second, the paper urges that this first point presents a 
dilemma: either police routinely act in an illegitimately extrajudicial fashion, or 
the stringency of the standards to which we hold criminal court procedures is, if 
it is grounded, not grounded directly in the fact that the courts administer 
punishment. Neither option is attractive. 
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The central goal of this paper is to show how police act in ways that are not 
obviously illegitimate, but fall under the moral standards applicable to 
punishment. This may strike some as surprising. The explicit job of the police 
does not include punishment. No official document will mandate punitive police 
action. Punishment is meant to occur downstream in the criminal justice system. 
Indeed, the wrongness of some of the paradigm cases of police malpractice is 
often described with the implication that such action is illegitimate because it is 
punitive.1 For instance, one author notes that in arresting people who have 
recently been violent, it is not uncommon for police deliberately to cause some 
physical suffering, by, for example, overtightening handcuffs. He continues: 
“…however deserved such measures may sometimes appear to be, they are 
improperly imposed and in that respect are unjustified… It is not for the police to 
inflict punishment.”2 Faced with this kind of case, we are led to the intuitive 
conclusion that punitive police action is, of necessity, an injustice. Nevertheless, I 
will argue, standard police tactics do in fact fall under any normal definition of 
punishment (or in any case, under the normatively relevant elements of any 
normal definition of punishment).3 
                                                      
1 By “punitive,” I mean “inflicting or intended to inflict punishment; retributive, punishing.” I 
leave aside its other meaning, namely, “Of a tax or other charge: extremely high, severe; (also) 
prohibitive, damaging” (Oxford English Dictionary). In conversation I have found that some 
understand “punitive” to mean “like punishment.” I leave aside that definition, too. 
2 JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING (1996), at 99–100. According to Kleinig, the police should 
not inflict punishment for the same reasons that Locke thought that private individuals should 
not carry out justice: they do a poor job of it. On this view, the properly drawn implication is not 
that punitive police action is unjust for the procedural reason that it is insufficiently downstream 
in the criminal justice process, but that punitive police action is in fact likely to be unjust; 
implicitly in this argument, it might not be unjust.  
3 Strictly, the central claim of my argument need not be that the police actions I focus on are 
punishment. My central claim is that some police actions fall under the normative standards that 
also govern punishment. That is, they fall under of the normatively relevant elements of any 
conception of punishment. In my view, the distinction is extremely fine, but my argument can 
honor it. For instance, it may be the case that “imposed by a legal court-like authority” is a 
nonnormative element of the definition of punishment. Thus, I allow that, as some will plausibly 
claim, the normal application of the words “punishment” and “punitive” involve courts, prisons, 
and so forth. In fact I doubt that such a definition is useful, but there are some things one might 
say in support of it: we in fact hesitate to describe punishment outside of the state as punishment 
proper; it is vigilantism, ersatz justice in place of legitimately administered punitive treatment. In 
any case, the claim of this paper is that the coercive and reprobative structures of the police, with 
their claims to legitimacy, are relevantly similar to those of courts, and so the relevant sort of 
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In short, some police and state action is not punishment, but is relevantly like it, 
with respect to the applicable normative standards. It may also be the case that 
some state action is punishment even though it is not labeled as such, and that 
some police action is punishment. That we sometimes express our belief that 
some noncourt act is excessive and unjustified with the claim that it is “punitive” 
should not distract us from the point that some noncourt acts must, in order to 
be justified, meet the same standards as those applicable to acts of punishment. 
What does this mean for our attitudes toward the criminal justice system? It 
presents a dilemma: either police routinely act in an illegitimately extrajudicial 
fashion, or the stringent standards to which we hold criminal court procedures 
are, if they are grounded, not grounded directly in the fact that the courts 
administer punishment. I will argue that neither option is attractive. 
In Section II I focus on some specific police strategies that seem to fall under the 
definition of punishment. It will be clear that the strategies I discuss are not the 
only possible instances of police action that fall under the definition of 
punishment. The claim I make naturally expands to other strategies. It will also 
be clear that not every instance of the strategies I describe falls under the 
definition of punishment. Nonetheless, this is not the place to determine 
precisely which police actions do, and which do not, count as punitive. The 
approach here is ecumenical. I hold that however one understands punishment, 
from a broad range of plausible possibilities, some everyday police action can 
constitute it.  
Having set up the prima facie case for my view, I consider a series of objections 
to it: a series of ways of holding that police merely enable criminal justice and do 
not enact it. Thus, some will object that police do not (properly) intend to punish 
and that their purposes lie elsewhere. I discuss that view in Section III.A, arguing 
that the intention behind an institution is not fully determinative of its normative 
status. Some claim that legitimate police actions do not carry the forms of hard 
treatment or deprivation that are characteristic of punishment. In reply, in 
Section III.B, I discuss how the deprivations of normally understood punishment 
compare with the deprivations of police actions. Section III.C addresses the idea 
that punishment is distinct because it involves an intention to impose a 
deprivation for its own sake. Noting the retributivist idea behind this objection, I 
argue that a built-up theory of punishment with such a backing will impute a 
relevantly similar kind of activity to police and the rest of the criminal justice 
system. Section III.D explores the relevance of censure, responding to the 
objection that normal police strategies lack the reprobation that is essential to 
                                                                                                                                                        
legal authority is present. That is, I require only that the court-like element of the definition (if it 
exists) must be normatively inert in this context. However, I leave aside this complication in the 
main text of the paper, since if I am correct, the concept of “punishment,” so conceived, is an 
arbitrarily limited subject of normative study, and we would more usefully reconceptualize it in 
order it to include police action. 
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punishment. Finally, in Section IV I argue that this presents a dilemma, 
threatening attractive views about either policing or punishment. 
II. Two Strategies 
A number of police strategies cause a deprivation or disadvantage to an 
individual in response to a perceived infraction. This much, at least, they share 
with punishment. In addition, many such strategies lack the goal of bringing the 
individual into the remit of a higher institution that will judge the case and 
sanction an authoritative response to the infraction. For the purposes of this 
paper I will focus on two examples. 
The first is the recruitment and management of informants by threat of 
prosecution. In recruiting informants, it is a well-established practice for police to 
offer to refrain from bringing a prosecution for a known or suspected crime in 
exchange for cooperation with a further investigation. In one recent study of 
informants in the United Kingdom, “84 per cent of police informers had either 
been in custody or facing charges when they were recruited and in 85 per cent of 
the examples it was the handler who launched the recruitment.”4 In the words of 
another study: 
In practice, “informal immunity” is granted if the informer keeps his or her part of 
whatever deal is struck, with participating informers only rarely prosecuted, and then 
not usually successfully.5 
By its nature this practice is difficult to measure and make public, and one might 
reasonably speculate that institutions would instinctively resist transparency 
about it. The offer of immunity may be formal, and on a par with a plea bargain. 
But it is also the case that police will make use of people’s legal vulnerability in 
order to recruit them for investigative purposes. Thus, the study continues: 
Where doubts arise as to the role of an informer, the Crown Prosecution Service should 
normally be involved in the decision-making process. The extent to which this happens 
in practice is unknown, although some officers do not even disclose the existence of 
informers to their supervisors, let alone the courts.6  
This practice is especially well documented in the United States, where 
guidelines for police making arrests of drug groups urge that arrests be 
                                                      
4 Tom Williamson & Peter Bagshaw, The Ethics of Informer Handling, in INFORMERS: POLICING, 
POLICY, PRACTICE (Roger Billingsley, Teresa Nemitz & Philip Bean eds., 2d ed. 2013), cited in STEVE 
HEWITT, SNITCH!: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN INTELLIGENCE INFORMER (2010), at 29. 
5 Colin Dunnighan & Clive Norris, Some Ethical Dilemmas in the Handling of Police Informers, 18 
PUB. MONEY MGMT. 21, 24 (1998). 
6 Id. at 24.  
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coordinated to make it easier for potential informants to cooperate while 
remaining undercover. Police and prosecutors may achieve this by lowering 
charges against individuals who are not expected to act as informants, so as to 
make the informant indistinguishable from the others from the perspective of 
the criminal organization.7 It should be emphasized the extent to which the 
process is typically police-driven: it occurs “immediately after, or sometimes in 
lieu of” arrest; it is run on agreements that are “often informal and rarely 
memorialized in writing”; and before charges are filed, “police can truthfully 
promise not to disclose [a possible informant’s] most recent crime to the 
prosecutor.”8 
The second type of police action is public-order maintenance by threat of 
prosecution. This involves the appropriate use of discretion with regard to minor 
transgressions. John Kleinig argues: 
The complexities of social life … call for situational judgements, and mere warnings or a 
legalism that feeds every formal infraction (misdemeanour) into the hopper of the 
criminal justice system are likely to be inadequate or inappropriately heavy-handed. 
This is especially the case with loitering with intent, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, public 
drunkenness, and the like. There is also a range of ill-defined minor offences, especially 
involving young people, to which police may (but perhaps ought not to) appeal for 
purposes of making arrests. The police officer may confiscate contraband, seek to ban a 
person from a particular venue for a time, or impose some other social restriction or 
requirement when arrest and processing might not be called for. At certain times and 
places, that role for the beat officer was recognised and valued.9 
The appropriate use of discretion is such that—ideally—a formal charge or 
warning is not brought against every infraction. Rather, by loitering or being 
drunk and disorderly in public, you make yourself liable to a formal procedure in 
criminal justice, but whether or not you are charged should depend on a police 
officer’s judgment of the value of doing so, given the context. Since both you and 
the officer have mutual knowledge of the possibility of a charge, and of what it 
depends on, the balance of power between you changes. The officer may decide 
merely to request that you move elsewhere. Knowing that you may otherwise be 
                                                      
7 Nicholas Fyfe & James Sheptycki, International Trends in the Facilitation of Witness Co-operation 
in Organized Crime Cases, 3 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 319 (2006); HEWITT, supra note 4; Clive Harfield, 
Police Informers and Professional Ethics, 31 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 73 (2012); Colin Dunnighan & Clive 
Norris, Risky Business: The Recruitment and Running of Informers by English Police Officers, 19 
POLICE STUD. INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. (1996). A classic study of this and related practices is Joseph 
Goldstein, Police Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the 
Administration of Justice, YALE L.J. 543 (1960). 
8 Michael L. Rich, Brass Rings and Red-Headed Stepchildren: Protecting Active Criminal Informants, 
61, no. 5 AM. U. L. REV. (2012), 1442. See also ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS 
AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2009). 
9 John Kleinig, Punishment and the Ends of Policing, in LIBERAL CRIMINAL THEORY: ESSAYS FOR 
ANDREAS VON HIRSCH (A. P. Simester, Ulfrid Neumann & Antje du Bois-Pedain eds., 2014). 
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charged, you comply with the request, even though you would prefer not to. And 
the criminal law governing police is sensitive to those facts. As with the case of 
informant recruitment, possible but undischarged uses of the law are alluded to 
by those holding power, with the goal of achieving a better outcome.  
One of the complexities of theorizing about the proper role of police is the matter 
of police misconduct. There is extra room for abuse in areas that permit 
discretion and judgment, and these are the areas that form the focus of this 
paper. The world of informants, in particular, gives rise to horrifying stories.10 
One response to the above kinds of cases will be to argue that police power to act 
with discretion should be severely limited or rescinded entirely. I discuss that 
view in Section IV. For the moment, we should distinguish between objections to 
the powers of an arm of the state that are based in the need for safeguards 
against possible or likely abuse, and objections that are consistent with proper 
use of the stated powers. The arguments I discuss fall into the latter category; 
this does not intrude on any argument concerning the “dangers to virtue” in the 
application of punishment.11 
III. How Police Punish 
The two strategies I described—recruitment and management of informants by 
threat of prosecution, and public-order maintenance by threat of prosecution—
involve causing a given individual a disadvantage or deprivation. They do so 
intentionally. They carry censure. They are enacted by state representatives. 
They are carried out in response to perceived wrongdoing, specifically, 
wrongdoing that involves a violation of established and announced laws. They 
have all of the core features of punishment. What distinguishes them from 
punishment? I believe that there is not a useful distinction. How might one 
distinguish police action? I will consider and reject four ways to do so. These 
appeal in turn to the intention to punish, the nature of punitive deprivation, the 
intention to deprive, and censure.  
A. Intention to Punish 
The intention or goal behind an act or practice is generally significant in 
understanding its nature and justification. Some will emphasize that, even when 
they use a great deal of coercion, police do not intend punishment; it is not how 
                                                      
10 See Sarah Stillman, The Throwaways, NEW YORKER, Sept. 3, 2012; Susan S. Kuo, Official 
Indiscretions: Considering Sex Bargains with Government Informants, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643 
(2005). 
11 As Michael Moore says, “the giving of punishment is dangerous to virtue.” A Tale of Two 
Theories, 28 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 27, 42 (2009). This fact infects the entire criminal justice system, 
from criminal courts to prosecution services to policing to prison officers. 
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they perceive their acts. Police would be surprised to learn that this is what they 
do. 
How can we capture this idea? It is tempting to claim, “X is punishment only if X 
is intended to be punishment by those enacting it.” Taken as definitional, this is 
unhelpfully circular, since the object of the relevant intention (a “punishing” 
intention) remains unspecified; insofar as the object of the intention is specified, 
it refers back to the term being defined. If it is a definitionally necessary 
condition for an act to constitute punishment that it is intended to be 
punishment, then in order to punish, one must have an intention that the thing 
one intends is a thing one intends to be punishment. One is reminded of the 
problems faced by a crude intention-based theory of meaning: just as the 
meanings of words cannot be fully determined by the intentions of those 
speaking them, neither can the proper designations of acts be fully determined 
by those performing them.12 Furthermore, if not fully punitive, police actions can 
be punishment-like; they can possess all of the features of punishment except a 
tendency normally to label them as punishment (if the tendency to label as 
punishment is indeed a feature of punishment).  
In further support of this claim, consider an argument about how definitions 
function in the debate on justifications of punishment. Some object to utilitarians 
that punishment of innocents is not really a kind of punishment; punishment is 
essentially, by definition, something that is meted out only to those it is believed 
have transgressed.13 But, continues the objection, utilitarians are committed in 
some conceivable circumstances to punishing known innocents. Therefore, 
utilitarianism has an inadequate theory of punishment: it fails by definition. H. L. 
A. Hart responds—and I agree—that the utilitarian can successfully reply that it 
does not matter whether some practice is called punishment; what matters is 
whether the practice is justified.14 If necessary, the utilitarian view could punish 
the guilty (where socially useful), and it could “shpunish” the innocent (where 
socially useful).15 The institutions of punishment and shpunishment are 
                                                      
12 “‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I 
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’—‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make 
words mean so many different things.’—‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be 
master—that’s all.’” LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS (1871). For discussion see Alfred 
F. MacKay, Mr. Donnellan and Humpty Dumpty on Referring, 77 PHIL. REV. 197 (1968). 
13 Thus, John Rawls refers to deprivations that have the aim of general deterrence but are meted 
out on those who are known to be innocent as “telishment.” John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 
PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). 
14 H. L. A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (2008). 
15 Analogously, see Robert Nozick on the proper allocation of healthcare resources and barbering 
resources. Some argue that healthcare resources should be distributed only according to health 
needs, and that anyone who denies this has misunderstood the nature of healthcare. Nozick 
responds by noting that this argument may apply to any other good, and that in so applying it, 
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sufficiently similar in their purported justifications, forms, and outcomes, that 
we usefully discuss them under the same heading. Alternatively, the utilitarian 
can reply, in the same spirit, that, rather than rejecting utilitarianism, we should 
revise our definition of punishment so that it might, conceptually, be aimed at 
the innocent. Either way, the complex of punishment and shpunishment (if the 
latter exists) deserves our attention. And Hart goes on to give reasons, not 
stipulated definitions, for why punishment should only be meted out to those 
have done wrong.  
Implicit in Hart’s argument is conceptual room for the existence of a practice that 
is (1) relevantly similar to punishment, but that (2) we are hesitant to label as 
“punishment,” while nonetheless is (3) on reflection ultimately justified. 
Furthermore, it is a practice that (4) we are hesitant to label as “punishment” 
because, prior to reflection, we sense it is unjustified (and not merely because we 
sense it is not punishment). If we go this far with Hart, then the first part of my 
argument, the establishment of the possibility of legitimate quasi-punishment, 
succeeds. There might be activity that may not normally be called punishment, 
but that falls under the same normative standards, and is justified or unjustified 
against those standards. In his case, Hart argues against the punishment of the 
innocent—but accepts it is a possible category. In my case, I suggest that punitive 
police action is also a possible category, and also suggest that such action may be 
justified.16 
                                                                                                                                                        
one realizes the argument’s circularity: one still requires a reason to conceive of the good in the 
way that one does. ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974), at 233–235. 
16 In further support of this point, consider the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights 
in Welch v. UK (1995). The Strasbourg court was asked to consider whether or not the United 
Kingdom had imposed a criminal penalty. The court’s conclusion rested on the reasoning that the 
criteria for criminal punishment and penalties have “autonomous meaning.” That is, it is not 
necessary or sufficient for an act to be punitive that it is labeled as “punishment” by the authority 
carrying it out; rather, courts should look to the nature of the act itself. Similarly, as Hale LJ 
wrote, dissenting, in R (Smith) v. Parole Board (2005): “to the person concerned it is experienced 
as punishment, whatever the authorities may say.” Cited in ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA ZEDNER, 
PREVENTIVE JUSTICE (2014), at 158. Thus, in deciding the applicability of Article 7 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ prohibition on retrospective punishment, courts must decide for 
themselves the relevant meaning of its constituent concepts. In the U.S. context, the legal position 
may be different:   
Courts…have given special emphasis to the intentions behind certain conduct when 
deciding whether it constitutes punishment...For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that sex offenders can be indefinitely confined after they complete a prison term 
without being punished for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 
Similarly, the Court has held that in many instances, property forfeitures, fines, and 
requirements to give up one’s occupation are not punishments for purposes of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. In deciding that these forms of harsh treatment are not 
punishment, the Court has put particular weight on the presumed lack of punitive intent 
on the part of the legislature.  
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Don Scheid provides another approach to the definition of punishment.17 
According to his view, punishment is a “reducible concept,” whereby, according 
to context, normally essential elements of its meaning can sometimes fail to be 
present. For instance, one may say that punishment is necessarily treatment of a 
person who has transgressed. But when one says, “an innocent has been 
punished,” the concept itself instantly reduces. The “transgression” element of 
the definition is, given the context of one’s utterance, no longer present; one is 
not simply saying something incoherent, equivalent to the claim, “this is a four-
sided triangle.” Scheid’s view is amenable to the argument I offer here. If all of 
the elements of the unreduced version of the concept are normatively relevant, 
then they should be present in police action too; if they are not, then we should 
not be distracted by the label “punishment,” especially in light of its distracting 
reducibility. 
B. Hard Treatment 
Some may object that police-imposed deprivations are not the kinds of 
deprivations that are characteristic of punishments. Punishment involves 
prisons, community service, and so forth. Police alone cannot coerce people into 
those things. 
In response, note, first, that punishment is not distinct from other kinds of 
treatment by the hardness of the treatment involved: punishment can involve a 
small or trivial kind of hard treatment, including (if one is willing to include them 
in the definition) suspended sentences, whereas actions by the state that are 
nonpunitive, including investigations that lead to trials, can be seriously 
disadvantageous.18 Police action in general can involve hard treatment, including 
hard treatment that is qualitatively similar to that meted out by courts: pretrial 
                                                                                                                                                        
Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEG. THEORY 1, 5 (2012), citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. 346 (1997). However, it may be that by “punitive intent,” we should understand 
“intention to impose deprivation or censure”—in which case, the position is one that I deal with 
in Sections III.C and III.D. In any case, legal decisions are not decisive for my purposes. The courts 
are seeking a definition in a legal context; they are seeking, for example, as the court was in 
Welch, to understand the proper implementation of the procedural element of Article 7 ECHR. 
They are not required to consider the wider question of the reach of the normative standards 
that are applicable to punishment in general. Furthermore, it is possible in any case that the 
courts misapply the concepts. The argument here is normative, not legal. So we cannot resolve 
this issue by looking at the state of the law. 
17 Don E. Scheid, Note on Defining “Punishment”, 10 CAN. J. PHIL. 453 (1980). 
18 In a broader context, Antony Duff offers the point in the following way: “[The] whole process of 
investigation and trial can involve burdens much like those imposed by punishment: loss of 
freedom, for those detained for questioning or pending trial; loss of money, in lost earnings or 
legal costs; serious intrusions on one’s time; the shame or embarrassment of being thus 
investigated, tried and exposed to public scrutiny; and the sense of being subjected to the forceful 
disciplinary power of the state. Such burdens also fall on those who are in the end not punished.” 
ANTONY DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2003), at xiii. 
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detention involves a deprivation of liberty that is burdensome in ways that full-
blown detention is burdensome. As Seumas Miller says, “harmful and normally 
immoral methods are on occasion necessary in order to realize the fundamental 
end of policing, namely the protection of (justifiably enforceable) moral rights.”19 
Whether or not Miller is correct about the ultimate grounds of legitimate 
policing, it seems clear that it involves imposing burdens.  
Thus, in the case of recruitment of informants by threat of prosecution, the act of 
informing is burdensome. It is time consuming, mentally demanding, and carries 
a risk of other kinds of harm. Like prison, it involves an objective element, 
measured in terms of a period of incarceration, and a subjective element, a 
varying effect that the incarceration will have on a prisoner. Similarly, public-
order maintenance also involves imposing deprivations. These may often be 
small deprivations. But it should be clear that this does not in itself disqualify an 
action from being a form of punishment; if there is a difference it must lie 
elsewhere. 
Now, a different and more powerful version of the objection that I am 
considering here could be mounted. It may be claimed that the offer to a suspect 
of an opportunity to turn informant is not a kind of hard treatment. If anything, it 
is a lessening in the level of hard treatment that a person would otherwise face. 
The offer provides a new option that would avoid a trial and possible custodial 
sentence. Police in these cases, continues the objection, do the opposite of 
punish. They ease the degree of deprivation received by those who have made 
themselves liable to receive more. On this view, even if some police coercion can 
impose greater deprivations than some punishments, the particular kinds of 
police action that I have proposed involve, on reflection, the reduction of 
deprivation, not the imposition of it.20 
However, consider the following case. A person is being sentenced, and is in fact 
liable to go to a certain high-security prison. In exchange for a certain 
commitment to cooperation, the judge recommends a different prison with a less 
strenuous regime. The convicted person accepts the offer. We still want to say 
that the new, less arduous sentence is a case of punishment. The police actions 
that I am considering have the same structure. One cannot, therefore, hold that 
some police action is not punishment merely on the grounds that it involves a 
reduction in the deprivation to which a person would otherwise be liable. The 
set of options imposed on the would-be informant, taken together—face trial, or 
act on behalf of the state in the ways that we request—is itself a form of hard 
                                                      
19 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS 
(Tom Campbell & Seumas Miller eds., 2004), at 184. 
20 The case of the management of minor infractions by way of an implied threat to arrest has a 
similar structure. Instead of bringing an individual within the formal criminal justice system, a 
person is given the chance merely to move on, surrender contraband, or accept a reprimand.  
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treatment. Amalgams of unattractive options can be conceptualized as hard 
treatment. For instance, the choice between two different prison cells itself is an 
application of a severe disadvantage on an individual. And the option one selects 
on accepting a plea bargain remains a punishment.21 Finally, it remains sensible 
to say that the individual or institution that makes the offer of a lesser 
deprivation nonetheless does impose that deprivation.  
To be sure, not every case of burdensome questioning, arrest, or search need 
count as a case of punishment. My claim in this section is that it is not sufficient 
to distinguish police action from punishment to assert that police action does not 
impose hardships (since that is false), and that it also is not sufficient to 
distinguish police action from punishment to assert that the deprivations that 
police action imposes are of a kind that disqualifies them from counting as 
punishment (since that is arbitrary). Further, my claim is consistent with it being 
the case that hard treatment by the police will generally be less severe and of 
shorter duration than deprivations that are imposed at sentencing: it remains 
possible that some punishments are less severe than some police actions, and it 
remains the case that both are impositions of deprivation by arms of the state. 
Now, it might be responded that police action is distinct because it carries a 
different kind of goal, or expresses a different attitude or claim. I turn to those 
responses in Sections III.C and III.D in turn.  
C. Intention to Deprive 
Several authors propose that in the case of punishment, hard treatment, or its 
accompanying deprivation, is directly intended.22 In contrast, there are many 
cases of foreseeably depriving, but justified, state action that lack a full-blooded 
intention to cause harm or deprivation. These include the charging of fees, civil 
commitment following a defense of insanity, quarantining, and large 
construction projects that are justified on balance but involve unwelcome forced 
purchase orders or deleterious effects on local businesses. Those practices 
involve either deprivation as a foreseeable side effect, or as a means to some 
other end, but do not have deprivation as their goal. Indeed, continues this line of 
argument, it is plausible that what makes punishment a distinct moral category, 
and marks it as falling under a distinct set of norms, is that it is especially 
difficult to justify an intended harm as opposed to a merely foreseen but 
unintended harm. Furthermore, there are coercive police practices that do not 
intuitively seem usefully categorized as punishment, because punishment has a 
goal-based or functional element, namely, an intention that a deprivation takes 
                                                      
21 Not all amalgams of unattractive options are themselves cases of hard treatment. For example, 
the choice “obey the law, or go to prison” limits one’s options, but it seems a stretch (depending 
on one’s view of the legitimacy of the state) to say that this is an imposition of a disadvantage. 
This remains the case even if one would benefit from unpunished criminality.  
22 E.g., DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT (2008), at 12–28. 
  
11 
place. For example, a normal arrest is not in itself punishment, since the coercion 
it involves is backed by an express goal of enabling a procedure that will pass 
judgment on the act that instigated the arrest.  
This point might be mobilized against the claim that I am urging in this paper. 
Thus, it will be argued that the intention behind any legitimate police action is 
not the direct imposition of harm or hard treatment. The proper purpose of 
coercive police activity is to make it less likely that people will be harmed, and to 
apprehend those who have acted criminally. And where it is possible for police to 
deploy strategies without their subjects being burdened or deprived, the police 
are right to choose that option. In the examples that I have offered as cases of 
punishment-like police activity, it might be objected, deprivation is merely a 
foreseen but unintended consequence of legitimate police action.  
1. The Relevant Intention Is Elusive 
The intention that we pick out in identifying punishment cannot be a literal one. 
The contents of trial judges’ minds are not decisive of the nature of the practice 
or its normative status. The intention should be understood, rather, with respect 
to the function of the practice. In grappling with this issue, Robert Nozick leaves 
the following question unanswered: 
The theory [of punishment] we have outlined…places intention within the institution of 
punishment, not simply behind it. Whose intention, then, is relevant: that of the prison 
guards (which shift?), the warden, the judge, the jury, the legislature, the citizenry? Or 
(like Durkheimean social facts), are certain intentions built into the institution, apart 
from the ascertainable intentions of particular participants?23  
If we take as relevant the actual intentions of the state agents participating in the 
practice of criminal justice in this context, we produce some odd results. Imagine 
that a trial judge or magistrate has had a long week of near-identical road traffic 
cases; negligently, but accurately, and out of habit, on autopilot, she follows 
through the process of sentencing. She is barely cognizant of the distinguishing 
features of the defendant in front of her, and responds to them on a level that is 
not properly conscious, even if it is legally correct. The probation officer is in a 
similar state of mind, and the prison officers notice little about the person 
convicted, processing him as part of a batch of others. In the process only the 
slightest glimmer, if any, concerning the specifics of the convicted crosses the 
consciousnesses of those state agents who are tasked with inflicting the 
punishment with regard to an intention to cause a deprivation. To be sure, the 
person on the receiving end of this treatment has a complaint. He is mistreated, 
or is treated correctly only by accident. But the point is this: however we assess 
the complaints in this case, it is clear that it is a case of punishment; whatever 
intention is necessary for punishment is present, and it is not the case that the 
punishment is diminished because the intention is dim and inchoate. The 
                                                      
23 ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981), at 380. 
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institutional arrangements are such that a deprivation has been deliberately 
imposed on the individual, in response to a transgression, and the deliberateness 
of this deprivation, insofar as it exists in a way that is constitutive of punishment, 
resides in the structure of the process rather than in the minds of any of the 
agents who implement it. 
Here is another case that establishes the same idea.24 Imagine two defendants 
who receive similar sentences from different judges. Both judges are fully 
competent in the jurisprudence of sentencing. The first judge has, in addition, a 
great deal of experience and understanding of the prison system, whereas the 
second does not. In sentencing, the contents of the two judges’ minds will 
inevitably differ. The first will be conscious of details of the process of 
incarceration, and will (or ought to) intend that these be imposed on the 
convicted person. Ignorant of those details, the second judge can only intend the 
broad outlines: the number of years, the probation conditions, and so forth. 
Supposing both defendants receive the same sentence, are we to say that the first 
receives a greater punishment than the second? We have three options: (1) 
accept that the punishment is greater; (2) deny that all punishment is 
intentionally applied deprivation; or (3) claim that the intention behind 
punishment exists elsewhere than in the mind of the trial judge. Option (1) is 
unacceptable, and option (2) contradicts the basis of the objection that I am 
considering here. We are left with the third option. 25 In addressing the objection 
that police treatment is not punishment because it does not involve intentionally 
applied deprivations, then, we should understand the “intention” as one that 
exists in the structure, or in the function, or in the institution itself.   
Some may take this point further, denying that punishment necessarily involves 
an intended deprivation.26 One might include within the category of punishment 
the foreseen but not intended effects of actions, or their likely effects, or the 
effects that the actor ought to take into account even if they have not in fact been 
taken into account. If this is the case, then a fortiori one cannot distinguish 
between court practices and police practices on the grounds that only the former 
intend deprivation. Nonetheless, let us grant that punishment involves an 
                                                      
24 Due to Kolber, supra note 16, at 3. 
25 A further option is that state punishment is constituted by some element of the judge’s 
intention, say, the given number of years of incarceration, but not by any specific facts about that 
incarceration. This view has problems of its own: a long period of intentionally lenient and 
comfortable incarceration would count as a heavy punishment. Furthermore, we would need 
some method or justification for the selection of only a subset of the judge’s intention, and in 
providing this, we either modify the definition of punishment (“intentional deprivation measured 
by years of incarceration”), or locate the relevant type of intention outside of the mind of the 
judge—which would be to adopt option (3).   




intentionally applied deprivation, but that the relevant intention behind state 
punishment rests in the institution of the state itself, rather than in any of its 
agents. I will argue that, with that premise, there is still reason to attribute that 
intention to some police action (Section III.C.2). Furthermore, there is reason to 
doubt, at the same time, that the relevant intention does exist in archetypal cases 
of punishment (Section III.C.3). 
2. Distinguishing Police and Court Intention 
The informant is not accidentally recruited. It is intended that the informant go 
through the process of informing. And it is known what this typically involves. 
Similarly, public-order police do not (or should not) accidentally threaten force 
or arrest, and the consequences of such exercises of power are clear. How can we 
make sense of the idea that the deprivations imposed by police actions are not 
intended? The process of informing involves taking time, risk, effort at deception, 
gathering and interpreting information, disruption of a person’s social network, 
and the provision of information to the handler. We might split the intention in 
this case apart. Perhaps the policy behind informant recruitment carries only the 
intention that information is provided to the handler. On this interpretation, the 
hardships that go with informing are foreseen but unintended consequences of 
the recruitment. If the informant could provide the information without going 
through those hardships, then this would be preferred. The deprivation itself is 
not intended. A similar strategy might be used for other police activity: insofar as 
it imposes any disadvantages, such disadvantages are not intended but are 
collateral effects of justified activities. The courts, on this view, intend the 
deprivations that they impose, and this is what distinguishes them as punishing 
authorities. 
This strategy walks a tightrope between placing so much state activity in the 
category of “foreseen but unintended consequences” that court-imposed 
punishment may be included, and being sufficiently ecumenical about 
“intentional” state activity that police-imposed deprivations can be counted as 
such. Note first that the test for intentional harm that is implicit in the argument 
is difficult to pin down. On some ways of making the test precise, police-imposed 
deprivations of the kind I am discussing will be counted as intentional. We might, 
for example, say that a harm is unintended if and only if, counterfactually, were it 
possible for the same outcome to be achieved without the harm, then the actor 
would choose that course. Despite its surface plausibility, this test diminishes the 
category of intended harms beyond our normal usage. Compare the case of a 
tactical bomber, whose bombs that are aimed at military infrastructure 
foreseeably kill civilians, and a terror bomber, whose bombs are targeted at 
civilians with the goal of lowering enemy morale. It has been noted that it may be 
the case that both the tactical bomber and the terror bomber would choose to 
drop their bombs and achieve their ends without killing civilians, were this 
option available.27 The difficulty is that this way of separating merely foreseen 
                                                      
27 JONATHAN BENNETT, THE ACT ITSELF (rev. ed. 1995), at 222. 
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from intended consequences does not capture all that we want from that 
distinction. It is also not obvious that the institution of punishment passes this 
test: according to this view, were it possible to achieve deterrence, 
reconciliation, and rehabilitation effects without imposing a deprivation, then, 
supposing this path would be followed, the setbacks involved in custodial 
sentences are deemed unintentional in the relevant sense, and thereby 
(according to this view) the sentence is not a form of punishment.  
More generally, there is reason to doubt that the strategy of arguing that police 
harms are unintended will succeed. In debates about the doctrine of double 
effect, the “terror bomber” is taken to be a paradigmatic case of intended harm, 
since the deaths caused are a direct means to a military end. The tactical bomber, 
on the other hand, does not use the civilians as a means; they are (in some sense 
that remains controversial) unconnected to the bomber’s purposes.28 The police 
strategies of informant recruitment, and many cases of public-order policing, are 
a much closer analogue of the former case than the latter. The targeted 
individual is directly involved in the strategy; the inevitable setbacks that are 
imposed by the police are part of an activity that is causally useful for the police 
in achieving their ends.  
Let us try a somewhat different tack. It might be argued that the difference 
between police action and punishment is that the justification behind police 
action does not rightly include the fact that the person has done wrong.29 On this 
view, police sometimes may intend deprivation, but they never rightly intend 
deprivation only on the grounds that it makes a person worse off. Only in the 
case of courts is the institution properly set up to aim at that. And, continues the 
objection, such an intention is distinctive of punishment. Thus, the police may 
aim at deprivation-for-the-sake-of-crime-prevention. This includes prevention by 
means of disincentivization of others and the prevention of criminal acts that 
would otherwise be carried out by those on whom police impose the deprivation. 
Police may also intend deprivation-for-the-sake-of-enabling-justice, including the 
imposition of bail and pretrial detention. But if they aim at deprivation-for-its-
own-sake, they step beyond their proper role. That is the role of the courts alone. 
This argument has the disadvantage that it defines nonretributive punishment 
out of existence, and to do so is to remove the grounds for discussing existing 
controversies. The objection supposes a retributivist interpretation of the 
criminal justice system. It imputes an intention to deprive behind the normal 
practice of punishment, and asserts that this intention is properly absent in 
police action. It is doubtful that punishment by definition has an intention to 
                                                      
28 For useful discussion see Neil Francis Delaney, Two Cheers for “Closeness”: Terror, Targeting 
and Double Effect, 137 PHIL. STUD. 335 (2008). 
29 See Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect,  PHIL. 
PUB. AFF. 334, 341ff. (1989). 
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deprive-for-its-own-sake behind it, because an institution that conceives of itself 
as punishing on nonretributive grounds still imposes punishment, even if on 
mistaken grounds. If the goal of the administering institution is purely to deter, 
then its activities may remain punishment (even if they are not justified).  
Some might respond by offering a separate name for impositions of hard 
treatment in response to a wrongdoing that have no intention of imposing a 
disadvantage for its own sake. Perhaps these might be called cases of 
“telishment” rather than punishment.30 This would be an unhelpful narrowing of 
a live debate, in which it is now clear that one need not in principle commit 
oneself to a simplistic consequentialism in order to hold that the existence of a 
deterrence effect might warrant the imposition of hard treatment.31 If it is 
legitimate to define out of existence “punishment” that is imposed on grounds 
other than intrinsic retributivism, then it is equally open for the nonretributivist 
to assert that the retributivist is not truly seeking to justify punishment, but 
rather some other concept, say, deservingment. Both moves are dialectically 
unhelpful. One does not need to think that retributivism is false (or indeed true) 
to think that it is a mistake to define away punishment that is not motivated on 
purely retributive grounds. 
D. Censure 
It is common to include in a theory of punishment an expressive or 
communicative element. For instance, for Joel Feinberg, punishment “has a 
symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.”32 In this 
section I discuss accounts of punishment that contain a communicative or 
expressive element. On such views, punishment is sanction and censure. It is 
hard treatment that carries reprobation for the breach of a rule.33 Standardly, the 
element of reprobation distinguishes punishment from taxation and fees, which 
are an expected part of doing business. My purpose here is to argue that it is 
possible for police action to express public censure. 
First let us develop the expressive view a little more. Punishment conveys blame 
or reprobation. In doing so it announces to the recipient of punishment a general 
social assessment of his or her actions and announces to the community, 
                                                      
30 This would be an expansion of Rawls’s category, mentioned in note 13 above. 
31 VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (2011). 
32 “Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and 
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing 
authority himself or of those ‘in whose name' the punishment is inflicted.” Joel Feinberg, The 
Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965). 




including the (purported) victim of the actions of the person who is punished, 
the judgment that a wrong has taken place. It might be said that the purpose of 
criminal sanction is to create censure.34 If punishment is not justified by its 
communicative function, or its expressive function, it is still plausible that it 
nonetheless is essentially communicative or expressive. The justification of 
punishment will in that case include a justification of that element of it. The 
expressive part justifies, or else it is in need of justification. Either way, it seems 
to be an element of the concept. 
The recruitment of an informant case expresses censure. The action says, “you 
have acted in this wrong way and you have thereby made yourself liable for 
punishment; if you like, you can accept a different burden, imposed on you by the 
state, instead of the formal punishment.”35 
To be sure, censure by police is not always public, in the sense that it is not 
always known by or accessible to members of the public. Some might use this 
fact in order to object that censure by police is thereby not punishment, or in any 
case has a different purpose or function, and should therefore be understood 
with respect to a distinct (and less restrictive) set of values. Thus, continues this 
objection, in police investigations in general, the censure is, even in the most 
open case, not public—and sometimes it is manifestly private, for good 
operational reasons. Informants provide an extreme case: by their nature their 
status must be cloaked. 
Nonetheless, the potential privacy of censure does not trouble the position I am 
urging here. It is one thing to claim that punishment should be carried out in 
public, and it is another to claim that purported punishment that is carried out in 
private is not punishment, or in any case falls under different and qualitatively 
weaker standards. The latter claim seems difficult to defend. Concealed state 
                                                      
34 Douglas Husak, Why Criminal Law: A Question of Content?, 2 CRIM. L. PHIL. 99 (2008). 
35 Here is another way in which police censure functions: it is possible for the censure that is 
formally attached to one transgression to attach, de facto, to another. In concerted preventive 
investigations, police will seek to identify any possible infraction, however minor, carried out by 
somebody who they suspect is carrying out a more significant crime. This is a case in which 
police use their powers in a way that is plausibly legitimate, and in a way that expresses public 
censure for actions other than those that provide the formal institutional authority for those 
powers. How else can we understand a police decision to deploy its resources in a determined 
way, so that somebody is arrested for something, anything? The expression of censure is not fully 
captured by the censure involved in punishing or arresting someone for their misclaimed 
benefits or their failure to maintain their car; it also exists in the public decision to align 
resources in such a way that the individual will be placed under scrutiny that is costly to him or 
her, and that decision about the alignment of resources is made in response to a wrong that it is 
believed the individual has committed. It is difficult to construe this as anything except hard 
treatment carrying with it a public expression of censure for crimes that have gone, formally, 
unpunished. The formal censure involved in investigation and prosecution for minor infractions 
can also be informal censure for major infractions. 
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punishment can exist. Its justification is a further question. It is thus important to 
distinguish between censure and stigmatization: the former implies the 
communication of reprobation and may or may not be public; the latter implies 
effective public reprobation.36  
The expressivist theory of punishment cannot focus merely on the words and 
writings of the trial judge; in order for that view to justify custodial sentences 
and other kinds of deprivation, it is necessary to argue that the hard treatment 
typical of punishment itself says something reprobative. My claim is that, insofar 
as we can make sense of this idea (and one key line of criticism of the 
expressivist theory voices doubts about this),37 we can see the same in police 
actions. 
IV. A Dilemma and a Project 
A. Dilemma 
I have argued that some police strategies that are not obviously illegitimate are 
cases of punishment. I note how those strategies have all the features of normal 
accounts of punishment: they are censorious, they impose deprivation, they are 
carried out by those in authority in response to a transgression, and so forth. I 
have considered a series of ways in which one might differentiate police 
activities from the activities of the courts, and found them wanting, for our 
purposes. I conclude that police, as we conceive of them, punish not just in cases 
of corruption or brutality or vindictiveness, but as part of the normal workings of 
their profession. 
This presents a dilemma. Either police routinely act in an illegitimately 
extrajudicial fashion, or the stringency of the standards to which we hold 
criminal court procedures is, if it is grounded, not grounded directly in the fact 
that the courts administer punishment. The dilemma arises because certain 
norms surround the practice of punishment. Not least among these is the idea 
that punishment of the innocent is an egregious wrong, and that we should 
therefore institutionalize steps to avoid it, such as the standards and burden of 
proof that exist at trial and the requirements of the publicity of criminal justice. 
Police action is not carried out in a way that provides direct access to those 
procedures. So if and when police action is punitive, we must either condemn it 
                                                      
36 Even though jurisdictions vary with regard to the circumstances in which a person’s criminal 
record may be revealed publicly, not all in the literature on expressivist or communicative 
theories make this distinction. E.g., Husak, supra note 34, at 18; Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond 
Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. 
L. REV. 183 (2011). For further discussion of the distinction between stigma and censure, see 
Katerina Hadjimatheou, Criminal Labelling, Publicity, and Punishment, 35 LAW & PHIL. 567 (2016). 
37 A. J. Skillen, How to Say Things with Walls, 55 PHILOSOPHY 509 (1980). 
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on the grounds that it fails to provide access to the proper procedures that 
necessarily attach to legitimate punishment, or we must limit the purview of 
those procedures as applicable only to a subset of cases of state punishment. 
This dilemma is of great significance for the way we theorize about the norms 
surrounding the criminal justice system: on one hand, it hardly needs stating that 
it is intolerable for police to act coercively beyond their proper role; on the other 
hand, our commitment to certain ideas about the proper application of 
punishment is deep.  
B. First Horn 
The first horn of the dilemma accepts that police routinely engage in activities 
that are properly described as punishment, and adds that those activities should 
therefore cease, perhaps to be reimplemented later only with a robust, court-like 
set of procedures. Some will be attracted to this conclusion, perhaps motivated 
in part by an awareness of patterns of police misconduct. Nonetheless, given 
what I have argued so far, it is an unattractive position. This is because so many 
police actions would be rendered illegitimate. The shared features of the kinds of 
cases that I have focused on are these: there is sufficient evidence for an arrest or 
prosecution, and there is a decision not to carry this out, but some other, lighter 
form of hard treatment is applied instead, usually with the consent of its 
recipient. Many police decisions have this structure, and the order-maintenance 
and informant-recruitment cases are extremely common. 
In the case of order maintenance, rather than an informal expression of censure 
or a demand that a person step away from a volatile scene, the options for police 
would be to set in motion the procedures of the formal criminal justice system 
(which would in many cases be heavy-handed and counterproductive), or to do 
nothing. Consider, furthermore, the following goal of community policing: 
The key...is that officers must identify and take action against disorder and minor crime, 
including the immediate conditions that encourage them. But taking action need not be 
limited to enforcement—actions should be more preventive, substantive, collaborative, 
and creative whenever possible. The public should still see their police addressing 
disorder and incivilities, but police methods should go well beyond...easy, simplistic, and 
possibly counter-productive zero-tolerance enforcement campaigns.38 
This ideal expresses one popular account of the function of police. It seems, 
however, on the present view, that when “preventive, substantive, collaborative, 
and creative” solutions involve the imposition of some burden in response to a 
perceived transgression, the police go beyond their proper role.39  
                                                      
38 Gary Cordner, Community Policing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND POLICING (Michael D. 
Reisig & Robert J. Kane eds., 2014), at 165. 
39 In further support of this point, it is notable both how narrowly full enforcement statutes have 
been interpreted, and also that they have not been universally adopted. There is reason to view 
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Similarly, informant recruitment backed by the possibility of prosecution would 
no longer to be a viable strategy. It would be necessary for police to have the 
kind of certainty of guilt that would be established by a trial before putting 
pressure on a person to become an informant. Proper procedure, indeed, would 
suggest that the process should normally be public; this sits in tension with the 
nature of undercover informant work. The practice is, nonetheless, currently 
ubiquitous.40 And on reflection, the judicious use of its legal powers is one ideal 
to which we hold the police force.41 I do not mean to suggest that the practice 
should be unregulated or is not in need of reform or new guidelines. Rather, my 
claim is that an effort to apply the normative limits to this practice that we apply 
to standard cases of punishment would wipe the practice out entirely, in a way 
that significantly reduces police ability to investigate networks of serious 
crime.42  
The first horn of the dilemma, then, would greatly limit police activity: in acts 
that involve the strategic reduction of deprivations to which people have made 
themselves liable, the police would be held to standards applicable to normal 
cases of punishment; such acts are so common and central to police activity that 
we would need to engage in a wholesale reconceptualization of the police 
function, placing novel and powerful limits on it.43 
                                                                                                                                                        
such statutes only as “broad statements of purpose and not as rigid requirements.” John Kleinig, 
Selective Enforcement and the Rule of Law, 29 J. SOC. PHIL. 117, 121 (1998). 
40 According to one UK study, “one third of all crimes cleared up by the police involve ... 
informers.” INFORMERS: POLICING, POLICY, PRACTICE (Roger Billingsley, Teresa Nemitz & Philip Bean 
eds., 2013), at 5. It has been suggested to me that this is likely to be true for serious crime, but 
not crime in general; in any case, it remains a highly significant practice. See note 4 above for 
references concerning the ubiquity of the possibility of prosecution as a motivation for informers. 
41 For development of what this means from a natural law perspective, see THOMAS V. SVOGUN, THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF POLICE: TOWARD A GENERAL UNIFIED THEORY OF LAW (2013). 
42 Jeffrey Reiman objects directly to informant recruitment by way of a threat to prosecute: “…it 
is a power which we would not grant to police over all citizens, since if we wanted that we would 
pass a law requiring all citizens to give police whatever information the police want.” Against 
Police Discretion, 29 J. SOC. PHIL. 132 (1998), at 137. This argument is unsuccessful: that we do not 
grant police this power over all citizens is consistent with our granting it over some. 
43 It might be argued that consistently following the argument of this paper would commit one to 
the view that prosecutorial power also can fall under the heading of punishment, especially 
where it is applied in order to obtain a plea bargain. This issue will depend on further 
understanding the category of punishment. It is plausible that a normal arrest is not punishment, 
since it aims at facilitating the courts’ procedures and so is not in itself censorious. A similar case 
may be made for normal use of prosecutorial discretion. In the United Kingdom the Crown 
Prosecution cannot increase or decrease charges in accordance with value of getting a conviction, 
and the option of offering to drop some charge in order to obtain a guilty plea is not directly 
available. I discuss plea bargains further below. 
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C. Second Horn 
So much for the first horn of the dilemma. Let us consider the second. This horn 
abandons the premise that punishment is a matter only for courts, thereby 
opening up space for an expansion of the theory and justification of punishment 
into the realm of police actions. This view is attractive not only because it avoids 
the conclusion that we must radically limit police activities, but also because it is 
in one way natural to put courts and prisons in the same normative field as 
policing: all involve state coercion in response to crime. Nonetheless, it is not 
easy to hold this view, if one also wishes to hold a conventional view of the 
grounding of our procedures surrounding punishment. The conventional view 
says: 
The procedural standards to which we hold court activities (such as the 
standard and burden of proof, and the requirements of publicity) are 
stringent because courts are in the business of administering punishment. 
In order to see the depth of commitment to the conventional view, consider the 
following idea, which is given due by a diverse range of theories of punishment: 
it is a grave wrong to punish those who are not liable to be punished.44 Call this the 
“seriousness of misapplication.” This expresses deep-seated beliefs about 
legitimate punishment. At the level of principle, the possibility that it will 
warrant or merely countenance the punishment of the innocent is a serious 
charge against a theory of punishment. The idea of the seriousness of 
misapplication is often seen to warrant directly the general high standards of 
fairness to which we hold the trial process.45 The serious wrong of misapplied 
punishment can be understood as directly grounding the procedural protections 
provided by the requirement that people be assumed innocent until they have 
been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 46 In particular, it is prominently 
expressed in the criminal justice system in its procedural deployment of the 
presumption of innocence at trial. For instance, the principle of presumption of 
innocence has been described as “a fundamental normative precept of the Anglo-
American conception of justice.”47  
                                                      
44 A classic assertion of this and other such principles is in Hart, supra note 14.  
45 Victor Tadros & Stephen Tierney, The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act, 67 
MOD. L. REV. 402 (2004).  
46 For discussion of the idea of a direct moral grounding of criminal justice procedures, see 
Patrick Tomlin, Extending the Golden Thread? Criminalisation and the Presumption of Innocence, 
21 J. POL. PHIL. 44 (2013). 
47 John Calvin Jeffries & Paul B. Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the 
Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1327 (1979). Cited in Tomlin, supra note 46, at 49. 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Of course, not all subscribe to this view.48 Thoroughgoing utilitarians will not 
hold it. Some may hold that it is a wrong to punish the innocent but also that it is 
a wrong to fail to punish the guilty, and that these wrongs balance one another. 
Some will argue that it may be a wrong but not a grave wrong to misapply 
punishment where the punishment is small, and furthermore that the 
punishment (if we may call it that) that is administered directly by police 
typically is small. Be that as it may, some police activity of the kind I am 
describing can impose a serious setback on a person. Furthermore, it will make a 
difference for many theorists whether such activity falls under the heading of 
punishment, and it would be a radical reform to put police and court coercion on 
the same footing.  
The conventional view becomes difficult to sustain if one also believes that there 
is a wide range of cases of punishment that need not be held to such standards. 
That is just where we are taken by the second horn of the dilemma that I am 
describing. According to this position, we must deny that the seriousness of 
misapplication of punishment grounds our strict court procedures. Instead, 
legitimate state punishment can exist without those procedures: it exists in 
everyday police actions. Normal expressions of a commitment to high standards 
of proof for the imposition of punishment do not admit of easy exceptions. On 
the view I am describing here, such exceptions are numerous. Someone might 
complain, “How dare the state punish me without full proof or procedure?” That 
complaint is now incomplete. 
D. An Escape: Legitimate Punishment Requires Access to 
Procedure, not Enactment of Procedure 
Both horns of the dilemma involve the idea that punishment can only 
legitimately take place in the wake of a stringent procedure. It may be responded 
that the standards that are applicable to legitimate punishment are not 
standards that must be met in every case, but describe procedures to which the 
person charged must have sufficient access. For instance, where a defendant 
pleads guilty it is legitimate to impose punishment without calling a full array of 
witnesses. Therefore, continues the objection, just as there are circumstances in 
which court process may legitimately impose punishment without a full-blown 
trial incorporating the presentation and interrogation of all of the evidence, so 
also are there circumstances in which the police may impose punishment-like 
deprivations without such procedure. Indeed, in the courts, such situations are 
the overwhelming norm: in the United States around 97 percent of federal cases 
                                                      
48 See Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 9 LEG. THEORY 295 (2003). 
  
22 
(after those that are dismissed) end in plea bargains,49 and defendants in Crown 
Court cases in the United Kingdom plead guilty at a rate of around 70 percent.50  
Now, continues this objection, our abhorrence at the wrongful conviction of the 
innocent does not give direct reason for court procedures, such as a presentation 
of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, to be manifested prior to every case of 
punishment; it requires only that those to be punished are able to activate those 
procedures should they choose to do so. Especially in the case of minor 
infringements, often all sides will reasonably prefer that the matter be settled 
before reaching full trial: both defendant and prosecutor will take the view that 
their resources are better expended on other matters.51 And the police strategies 
that I have described do in fact provide the target with access to full court 
procedure should they prefer it. The proposed informant can refuse to inform 
and instead face the charges that the officer proposes will be brought; the 
protester can refuse to follow the officer’s instructions and face a public disorder 
charge. Thus, concludes the objection, it may be the case that certain standard 
coercive police action falls under the rubric of punishment, but so long as those 
subject to it have the opportunity to challenge the police and to pursue the issue 
in the courts, such police activity is not rendered illegitimate. If so, the second 
horn of my dilemma—that we struggle to explain why court-imposed sanctions 
are restricted in a way that police action is not—falls away, since punitive police 
action can permissibly take place where it leaves the option of a pathway to the 
courts.  
In response, note first that that we do not tend to think that mere formal access 
to procedure is sufficient to achieve its purposes. Plea bargains provide a useful 
case study. For instance, many find that formal access falls short in cases in 
which the threat of greater charges provides people with an overwhelming 
incentive not to invoke the procedure. In exchange for a commitment to plead 
guilty to a lesser charge, a prosecutor might agree not to bring to court a more 
serious possible charge. Alternatively, in exchange for a commitment to plead 
guilty to a subset of possible charges, a prosecutor agrees not to bring the full set 
of possible charges to court.52 In seeking a just system of plea bargains, Richard 
Lippke argues as follows: 
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If those guilty of crimes can be brought to confess them openly and honestly, then not 
only will we save precious resources investigating crimes, we will also obtain a greater 
level of assurance that when we inflict punishment, we do so justifiably. Given the 
considerable moral hazards involved in punishing individuals, this higher level of 
assurance is not to be gainsaid. Granted, criminal trials require state officials to 
demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that defendants are guilty of the crimes with 
which they have been charged. If that standard is truly and fully met, then the officials 
who impose punishment act defensibly in inflicting punishment on those convicted of 
crimes. Yet the standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” might be met more fully or even 
exceeded if defendants themselves candidly admit and fully disclose their crimes. In 
doing so they may reveal things that definitively affirm their guilt. We might therefore be 
able to say with some confidence that our punishing them is justified to a higher 
degree—“beyond all doubt,” as it were.53 
It is notorious that plea bargains may be structured so that an innocent 
defendant faces a strong incentive to plead guilty to a smaller charge, borne of 
the possibility of facing a very serious charge and augmented by poor standards 
of indigent legal services and wide prosecutorial discretion with regard to the 
charges brought.54 Such incentive structures render the guilty plea as poor 
evidence, contrary to the function that Lippke outlines.  
Just as innocents faced with plea bargains can have perverse incentives to accept 
them, so also can the balance of power in cases of police activity be such that 
mere formal access to court procedures is insufficient to make compliance with a 
police offer good evidence of wrongdoing. In order to urge the suspect to inform, 
the option of facing prosecution may be made yet less attractive, with greater 
investigative assiduousness leading to greater or better-substantiated charges. 55 
One writer on this subject agrees that the decision to inform may be less than 
autonomous for these reasons, but argues, further, that this coercive element 
does not render the process unjustified: “the potential informant’s vulnerability 
to the State’s unequal bargaining power results from the informant’s voluntary 
and knowing decision to engage in criminal conduct.”56 As that author notes, this 
is not the whole story, since it assumes away the possibility of misapplication.57 
Where the state erroneously uses such coercive capacity in order to impose a 
deprivation on somebody who has not in fact made herself liable to such 
treatment, our sense that a person has been wronged is akin to our sense of 
wrong in cases of misapplied punishment. 
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Nonetheless, there will be cases in which the decision to cooperate would 
provide sufficient evidence of wrongdoing that we would sense that the police 
imposition of hardship is justified. Where the evidence against an individual is 
strong, and the perverse incentive effects of charging and investigative 
structures are minimized, we will be able to describe a set of cases in which 
police legitimately deploy their powers in order to obtain cooperation instead of 
arrest. These will include cases in which the cooperation is experienced as a 
hardship that is imposed as a response to a wrongdoing.  
We can see, then, the beginning of a way out of the dilemma that I have 
described. If this route is pursued, it will have implications for the way that we 
understand and theorize about the police role. The escape does not deny my 
characterization of some normal police activity as punishment. Rather, it seeks to 
provide a framework for legitimizing it. This invites a novel way of 
understanding the theory of police, one that is closer to theories of punishment 
than is usually considered. Further, this view speaks in favor of the need for 
certain kinds of judgment on the part of police, who may in some cases only 
legitimately apply force or coercion where there is an effective (and not merely 
formal) opportunity for a person to avoid it.  
V. Concluding Remarks 
I have argued for a claim that seems at first blush counterintuitive: certain 
standard police practices are normatively on a par with punishment. The thesis 
is less surprising when we notice other areas outside of penal institutions in 
which both our practices and our theorizing reach for principles standardly 
applicable to punishment. For example, Douglas Husak argues that relegislating 
preventive detention as criminal punishment would have “the virtue of 
candor.”58 If it is possible for punishment to exist outside of the criminal process 
in the form of preventive detention (even if uncandidly), then one naturally 
wonders what other actions by prosecuting authorities and police could amount 
to cloaked forms of punishment. Against the spirit of Husak’s argument, it may 
be the case that actions that fall under the normative standards of punishment 
legitimately exist outside of direct court authority. Police work as we (upon 
reflection) conceive of it exhibits a large amount of discretion; this is exemplified 
by the strategies of prosecution-backed informant recruitment and public-order 
policing on which I have focused here.  
If this is correct, then we should feel a jolt, both theoretically and practically. At 
the level of theory, my argument poses a threat to the traditional divide between 
the courts as the enactors of criminal justice, and police as mere enablers. Our 
assessment and justification of the criminal justice system ought to be a great 
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deal more alive to the effects of policing, including acts that fulfill the normal 
criteria of punishment. And thus, in the realm of practice, we face a dilemma that 
threatens either a popular conception of legitimate policing, or a popular 
conception of legitimate punishment. Finally, I have sketched a view that would 
escape this dilemma, while still endorsing the characterization of some normal 
police activities as punishment. 
 
